tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8484964530322163939.post7294572402575685366..comments2023-10-07T05:24:14.956-04:00Comments on Skeptical Observations: Tavris and Aronson’s Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Reading NotesMiles Rindhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03733605717776262840noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8484964530322163939.post-51476871625255178582012-06-18T00:02:39.213-04:002012-06-18T00:02:39.213-04:00Fair enough--I haven't read their book.
I su...Fair enough--I haven't read their book. <br /><br />I suspect people probably often intend something like that when talking about dissonance, if they were pushed to be clearer about what they really mean, but I could be mistaken.JewishGadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03531540800635608198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8484964530322163939.post-82093509612591508492012-06-17T11:07:13.304-04:002012-06-17T11:07:13.304-04:00Thanks for visiting and commenting, JG. I still ha...Thanks for visiting and commenting, JG. I still have an unfinished draft of a further discussion of cognitive dissonance that I abandoned about a year ago when I left off posting here. Getting a comment makes me think of returning to work on it. <br /><br />Your analysis seems to me entirely defensible as a way of presenting the notion of cognitive dissonance; but the fact remains that it does not agree with the exposition given by Tavris and Aronson. In the passage that I quote, they flatly assert that in their example the cognitive dissonance obtains between the thoughts “Smoking is a dumb thing to do because it could kill me” and “I smoke two packs a day.” I like your account much better, but that is mainly because you are not guilty of the sort of ineptitude and logical confusion that vitiates their account. After writing this post I started reading Festinger’s <i>A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance</i>, which uses the same example, and found his account to be equally incoherent. You would think that with 50 years of further discussion, a psychologist who is a leader in his field would become aware of these logical errors and correct them; but apparently he is content simply to repeat them.Miles Rindhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03733605717776262840noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8484964530322163939.post-25318749549995283882012-06-17T03:17:03.515-04:002012-06-17T03:17:03.515-04:00So, I'm a tiny bit late commenting on this. B...So, I'm a tiny bit late commenting on this. But I don't think the inconsistency intended here is a logical one. I think it is grounded in other beliefs/desires a person holds, and can be thought of in light of the practical syllogism: if I believe cigarettes are harmful to me and I desire not to be harmed, the rational conclusion is that I should not smoke. If I am smoking, there is a contradiction between the action normatively prescribed by my beliefs/desires (not smoking) and what I am doing (smoking); they cannot fit into the same practical syllogism. So, I can revise my actions to be consistent with my beliefs/desires or revise my beliefs/desires to make my current action rational. <br /><br />I don't think that needs to involve self-evaluation, although it can, and I do think it can be about maintaining a consistent self-narrative. I suppose my account above makes it sound more about maintaining a rational self-narrative.JewishGadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03531540800635608198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8484964530322163939.post-59589241572945637982011-12-16T04:56:06.311-05:002011-12-16T04:56:06.311-05:00A remark on psychological inconsistency: “Smoking ...A remark on psychological inconsistency: “Smoking is a dumb thing to do because it could kill me” and “I smoke two packs a day” are certainly not logically inconsistent under interpretation. But I think the vague notion of "psychological inconsistency" is best read as a sort of akrasia. A Davidsonian reading would say, that they imply "inconsistent" preferences, which can be seen if we add the proposition, "I, ceteris paribus, want to lower the probablity of myself dying." (and we generally attribute this proposition to people). <br /><br />But then again, preferences, by defition, cannot be inconsistent - they can only have an "unusual" transitive ordering, in this case the ordering would state that I prefer smoking to the increase in the probablity of myself dying.<br /> <br />And I think the "discomfort" can be seen exactly as an effect of imagining having to justify this ordering of preferences and the "inconsistency" (and yes, this a vague use of the term "inconsistency") can be seen as our failing to defend this ordering.Presskornhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03480116067878605339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8484964530322163939.post-19962235998021266012011-05-23T12:13:34.428-04:002011-05-23T12:13:34.428-04:00Thanks for the excellent discussion. I too find it...Thanks for the excellent discussion. I too find it shocking how common it is to find serious conceptual slippage and logical sloppiness in the thinking of professional psychologists. And it is dismaying, also, that poorly defined techinical terms, such as this business you've pointed out about 'cognitive dissonance' in the book, are deployed not just in academic theoretical discussions of human behavior, thought, and feeling, but to "diagnose," and hence serve as a ground for "treatment" of actual, flesh and blood, human beings.Lauren T.https://www.blogger.com/profile/10931424852678375164noreply@blogger.com